Objectives. To determine the compliance of radiation technologists to technical guidelines in daily practice for radiotherapy treatment and whether there are differences in compliance across organizational units.
Introduction
To address the challenge of patient safety issues, not only is a (multidisciplinary) team of professionals required, but also a well-established safety organization. In the Netherlands, current health care performs far below the acceptable levels of patient safety [1] . Health care settings using advanced technology and (multidisciplinary) teams of professionals such as operating rooms [2] and radiotherapy departments [3] are settings where patient safety problems are likely to occur.
Radiotherapy is, besides surgery and chemotherapy, one of the treatment options for cancer. The increase in the aging population contributes significantly to a growth in the need for radiotherapy capacity [4] . Treatment for patients with radiotherapy can be divided into two main phases: treatment planning and treatment delivery [5] . Treatment planning is a multidisciplinary process resulting in a detailed plan for treatment delivery. During treatment delivery, the patient actually receives irradiation generated by a linear accelerator. This process is typically executed by three radiation technologists. Two radiation technologists position the patient inside the treatment room. The third radiation technologist operates the linear accelerator in the operating room. On average, most patients receive a 10-min treatment session each day, four to five times a week for 6 weeks. The practice of delivering radiotherapy treatment is prescribed in technical guidelines. Radiation treatment is routine work that occurs in a highly complex technical environment and thus creates substantial safety hazards [6, 7] .
Since 2007 health care organizations in the Netherlands have used a consensus definition for patient safety: 'the absence of physical and/or psychological harm to a patient, caused by health care professionals who did not act according to professional standards and/or caused by a shortcoming of the health care system' [8] . A widespread technique to measure and improve patient safety is root cause analyses of incidents [9] [10] [11] , e.g. the bow-tie model [11] or the Prevention and Recovery Information System for Monitoring and Analysis (PRISMA) [11 -13] . However, these techniques are based on voluntary reporting, which raises questions about the reliability of the data [14] .
To overcome this weakness, the reliability of a specific process can be determined by measuring deviations from standard processes of care. Deviations often occur within the health care sector. The relative frequency of these deviations determines the reliability of the process. According to the Institution for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) standards, a process reliability of 99% is desirable [15] . A deviation in treatment procedures may not lead to treatment errors. On the basis of the iceberg model, deviations in safety barriers are, however, directly related to incidents. The Swiss cheese model of Reason [9] shows how defenses, barriers and safeguards may be penetrated by an accident trajectory. Not all of these deviations are captured by a voluntary incident reporting system [14] . Another method to measure these deviations is to observe daily practice. Observation by means of observers being present during the treatment of patients is expected to bias the results, because of the Hawthorne effect. Video observation can be used to minimize the bias. Video observation has been successfully used for detecting deviations in the pediatric field [16] .
The current study focuses on the reliability of care processes in radiotherapy practice. In the radiotherapy institution observed in this study, three main multidisciplinary units operate. Each unit consists of oncologists, radiation technologists and physicists. In the past, different technical guidelines were followed by the three units, because of different treatment sites, physical environment, equipment and available staff. In 2007, the three units merged into a new clinic in Maastricht. From that moment on, all units have followed the same technical guidelines for treatment delivery. Although the three units follow the same technical guidelines in theory, do they follow them in daily practice as well? In this study, compliance to procedures within and across the two units of radiation technologists is measured, using an objective and unobtrusive method for measuring the compliance to technical guidelines.
Methods
The current study focuses on the reliability of the treatment delivery process in a radiotherapy practice in the Netherlands. First, the study setting is described. Second, the process of treatment delivery is outlined in more detail. Finally, the way the observations are carried out and analyzed is explained.
MAASTRO clinic is a radiotherapy institution in the Netherlands. It is divided into three main multidisciplinary units, each specialized in certain treatment sites (Table 1) To examine the variability in the process of treating a patient, a detailed description of the process is essential. However, the technical guidelines for practice are open to different interpretations. To describe the actual working process based on consensus, a project group, consisting of 25 radiation technologists (out of 60) from all three units, was formed. The project group discussed their working procedures using value stream mapping [17, 18] . the observations, a score list has been developed. Seven technologists have been asked separately to select tasks out of the flowchart that are most important for patient safety. They selected 18 key tasks to be used as score items for observation (Table 2 ). These tasks are covered by 28 items (score list) to capture the variety of every day practice. For every cancer diagnosis, different guidelines on the linear accelerator are followed by the radiation technologists. Breast cancer patients are a relatively large proportion of the treated population within MAASTRO clinic; in 2007, they represented 17% of the entire patient population receiving treatment. Patients receiving treatment for breast cancer were selected for inclusion in this study. Table 1 shows that only units 2 and 3 provide this treatment, so only these two units were included in the study.
To observe actual practice of technologists working with the linear accelerator, a fixed camera system has been installed. During the observation period, the processes at the treatment room, operating room and the labyrinth (where the radiation technologist guides the patient from their dressing Check position of patient's hands using the patient information 8.0 1.98 8.
Observe equipment during treatment 7.9 1.89 9.
Check ID photo before getting patient out of change room 7.7 2.25 10.
Call patient by name to check the identity 7.4 2.04 11.
Read communication form before calling the patient by intercom 7.4 2.13 12.
Ask for patient's name to check the identity 5.6 2.71 room to the treatment room) were recorded using fixed cameras. Only part of the recordings was analyzed. The radiation technologists did not know which recordings were used for analysis.
To analyze the video recordings, two observers were trained. The inter-observer variability was calculated based on the comparison of the results of six treatments observed separately by the two observers. An inter-observer agreement of 82% (Kappa: 0.76) was detected for the total score list (28 items). All tasks mentioned in Table 2 had an inter-observer agreement of 83% or higher, except for the tasks 2, 6, 7, 10 and 12 an agreement score of 50-67% was measured.
Treatment of 56 patients for breast cancer was recorded. Among these, 32 treatments were performed by unit 2 and 24 treatments by unit 3, distinguishing whether a task has been performed or not and by whom. Within a unit, compliance was measured as the proportion of the observations for which the task was executed. The overall compliance was measured by the mean of the proportion of compliance for all items. For the comparison between units, chi-squared tests were calculated for the proportions of compliance.
To interpret differences in compliance to tasks, all radiation technologists were asked to complete an anonymous questionnaire to determine the perceived level of importance of 12 key tasks. For each key task, the radiation technologists were asked to score the level of importance on a scale from 1 to 10. Extra collected items were the date, the unit and whether the radiation technologist was a member of the project group or not. The mean importance scores and their standard deviation of each task were calculated. Twenty-three of the 43 technologists (53%) returned the questionnaire to determine the level of importance for the 12 tasks. The returned questionnaires were equally distributed over the two units and over the members and non-members of the project group.
Results
The technologists' ratings of the importance of each task are shown in Table 2 . The 'cross-check of SHIFT movement' scored highest for the perceived level of importance with a mean score of 9.8 and a standard deviation of 0.52. 'Ask for patient's name to check the identity' showed the lowest score with a mean score of 5.6 and a standard deviation of 2.71. Unit 3 staff perceived 'call the patient by name to check the identity' as more important than unit 2 [D ¼ 2.0 (0 -10), a ¼ 0.03]. This was the only difference observed between the two units. Members of the project group (the 25 selected radiation technologists) gave a lower score on average to the task 'observe patient and technique during treatment' than the 35 radiation technologists not participating in the project group [D ¼ 2.1 (0 -10), a ¼ 0.02].
Across the 18 tasks, overall compliance (average of the mean compliance for each task) was 59% and ranged from 2% to 100% per task. Among the tasks involving checks before irradiation can start, compliance for the cross-check of the SHIFT movement by hand (task 12) was 100% ( Table 3 ). The reflection of the treatment field on the patient is another check before irradiation can start. Although different methods can be used (and there is no consensus on which is best for the patient), the most used method, in which the reflection on the patient is compared with a print of the treatment plan, showed a compliance of 89%. However, in 2% of the cases, the reflection of the treatment field was not checked at all. The ID check of patients consists of three separate steps.
Step 1 compares the ID photo with the patient's face, and for this, compliance was 52%. For step 2, the patient's name is asked. None of the technologists complied with this task (0%). Instead, the technologists called the patient by her/his name (a non-conforming step) in 29% of the cases. For 25% of the cases, the observers could not determine whether the task was performed or not and therefore judged them as unknown. For the remaining 46%, no name check was performed.
Step 3, asking the patient's date of birth showed a compliance of 95%.
An example of a task with low compliance was the check of treatment tools set out by the other technologist, with a compliance of 2%. Besides these 18 key tasks, observation of the patient and the equipment during the radiation were also mentioned as an important task. In 40% of the cases, the patient was observed less than 10% of the time of irradiation and in 70% less than 25% of the treatment time. In 36% of the cases, the equipment was observed less than 10% of the time, and in 66% of the cases, the equipment was observed less than 25% of the treatment time. The difference between the percentages of technologists observing the patient and the equipment was not statistically significant.
For some actions, a difference was observed between the two units (Table 3) . A significant difference was found for the check of the patient's ID. One unit showed 67% compliance, whereas the other unit showed 39% compliance (a ¼ 0.04) for comparing the ID photo with the patient's face. The compliance on the check of the position of the hands of the patient with the digital photograph also showed significant differences between the units. One unit showed 81% compliance, whereas the other showed 21% compliance (a ¼ 0.00). For the check whether the treatment field has been set correctly, various methods can be used and the two units revealed different choices. One method consists of comparing the reflection of the treatment field on the patient with a print of the treatment plan. One unit choose this method in 97% of the cases, whereas the other unit choose this method in 79% (a ¼ 0.03). Unit 2 showed that in 25% of the cases, the treatment field was checked by two technologists, whereas unit 3 checked this in 46% of the cases by two technologists (a ¼ 0.00).
Discussion
This study has examined whether technical guidelines are adhered to in daily practice of radiotherapy treatment and whether the different units practice consistently with one another. Video observations were used to evaluate the compliance to non-described working procedures. A comparison between the ideal situation and daily practice showed an Compliance to technical guidelines overall compliance of 59% (measured on 18 items) which is moderate. As only medical protocols and technical guidelines were present, that do not tell professionals how to handle situations in specified ways, a large variation in daily practice was expected [15, 19] . Some actions were based on consensus, whereas other actions were imposed by the technologist superiors. These imposed actions were mostly based on ideas that the technologists are not aware of, resulting in limited understanding by some technologists and sometimes reluctance to comply. The implemented actions were not evaluated after a specified time and adjusted if needed, e.g. the task 'ask for the patient's name to check the patient's identity'. This action was conducted with comparing an ID photo with the patient's face along with asking for the patient's date of birth. However, in informal discussions, technologists claimed that, asking for the patient's name, was of little value and unfriendly to the patient. One technologist stated 'it felt like treating the patient as a number and not as a person'. In daily practice, the technicians have never followed this task (compliance 0%). Instead, they developed a new action, name the patient by his/her name. Still, this self-developed action was not rated by the technologists as being of great value and showed a low compliance (29%). Asking for the date of birth was, however, regarded as a strong check for patient's identity, which resulted in high compliance (95%). The level at which technologists experience the importance of the task seems to be related to the level of compliance. The more a task is perceived as important for patient safety, the higher the level of compliance for that task. On the basis of the Rasmussen/ Amalberti framework, frontline workers do not follow procedures in a strict and logical manner, but try to follow the path that seems most useful and productive at that time [20] . A score list to observe patient treatments was designed and showed satisfactory results in terms of inter-observer reliability [21] . The procedure to create the score list probably had an influence on culture and creating consensus as well. During the sessions between the radiation technologists from the project group, resulting in the score list, the value of every action was discussed. This resulted in more consensus and understanding within the group of radiation technologists.
In informal discussions, the radiation technologists expressed that they experienced the presence of the cameras as negative, especially the recording of sound. Because no judgments were made of individuals and the two observers handled the observations with care for privacy, the technologists accepted being observed. Some positive aspects of video observation with a fixed camera system are that the cameras are not strikingly noticeable and, therefore, less distracting than movable cameras.
For several actions, a difference has been detected between the two units. In particular, two actions showed a difference in compliance: comparing the ID photo with the patient's face and check the position of the patient's hands. This difference could be the result of a different logistics in the past as well as differences during treatment of other treatment sites. Difference in culture between the units could be the most influential factor explaining the difference in practice.
To conclude, a large variation in practice is the result of no available standard operating procedures. Only global actions are defined, but they are not described in detail and are not assigned to individual technologists. On the basis of the observations, it can be concluded that although the professionals think they perform all the tasks they mention as important to the process, in practice they do not.
Although both units follow the same guidelines for practice, they did not show the same practice. Therefore, it seems unwise to treat patients with mixed teams, combining technologists from different units in this setting.
To combine the teams of technologists from different units and treat patients in a safe and correct way, the technologists could develop standard operating procedures and evaluate them constantly. Standard operating procedures specify actions in great detail in terms of time and responsibilities [19, 22] . However, since the technologists have a long history of working without standard operating procedures, it will be difficult to break this routine. Therefore, regular feedback on compliance, constant redesign and promotion of the procedures developed by themselves are essential for improving the technician's motivation to deliver best practice [18] .
